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Abstract  This paper explores the institutional dimension of the implementation of the new generation EU 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) from a fundamental rights perspective. The creation of an 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs is what makes them operational. It enables the other 
dimensions to become “alive” and not to remain words within a text. Given the plethora of entities 
created by the new generation of EU FTAs, this paper investigates the extent to which the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to protect and promote fundamental rights. This 
investigation shows that, despite significant novelties, several limitations remain. Gaps in the 
mandate and deficiencies in the decision-making processes lead to foresee little consideration of 
fundamental rights at the implementation stage.  
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1. Introduction  
The creation of an institutional framework for the implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is 
what makes them operational. It enables the other dimensions to become “alive” and not to remain words 
within a text. The institutional governance of the new generation of EU FTAs has been said to have “widened 
and deepened”.1 New entities created by EU FTAs have been delegated substantive decision-making powers, 
and their influence expanded into policy areas traditionally the prerogative of States. What kind of institutions 
these are, how they work and their implications for the protection of fundamental rights, are all questions that 
have been largely neglected by the literature on EU external trade.2 Institutions have been the focus of literature 
on international relations, sociology and organisational studies, while legal accounts have been limited to 
legalisation, compliance and enforcement issues. This paper wants to provide a different account: it conducts 
an analysis of the legal framework of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs and engages in normative 
explorations of its relationship with fundamental rights. 
Institutions are interpreted here broadly as encompassing bodies set up by rules which will form expectations 
with an impact on human behaviour and political action.3 Institutions are considered to produce “living 
agreements” that can endure and give rise to a new legal order, by way of legal outputs and exchanges arising 
from institutionalised practices and cooperation.4 Following this understanding, the paper considers the 
significance of the plethora of new entities created by the new generation EU FTAs. From a fundamental rights 
perspective, their significance lies on two extremities. On the one hand, the literature attaches a series of 
advantages to institutions: from assuaging uncertainty and concerns of delegation of authority;5 to prompting 
positive practices of transparency6 and enabling forums for sharing information and linking issues together.7 
On the other hand, the literature on democratisation beyond the State typically stresses legitimacy deficits of 
institutions operating beyond the State. In the context of trade, research has shown that concerns over 
fundamental rights may be kept at bay.8 In light of these trade-offs, the paper asks: to what extent is the 
institutional architecture for the implementation of EU FTAs adequate to protect fundamental rights?  
To answer this question, the following sub-questions are addressed: does this institutional architecture take 
into account fundamental rights? How does it differ across trade partners? What are its limitations? What could 
be improved to make it better equipped to deal with fundamental rights? According to Keohane, strengthening 
institutions so that they reflect legitimate social purposes is a major challenge for our time9 and “an adequate 
judgment of their worth depends on an estimate of the contribution they are likely to make, in the future, to 
 
1 Lore Van Den Putte and Jan Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions’ (2015) 31 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 263, 269. 
2 Some exceptions include i.a. ibid, Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional constraints and 
proposals for strengthening the European Parliament' (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 532; and Emanuel Castellarin, 
‘The joint committees established by free trade agreements and their impact on EU law’, in Isabelle Bosse-Platière and Cécile 
Rapoport, The Conclusion and Implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements: Constitutional Challenges (Edward Elgar 2019). 
3 Simon Bulmer, ‘New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public 
Policy 365, 368. 
4 Marija Bartl, ‘Making transnational markets: the institutional politics behind the TTIP’ (2016) Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper No. 2016-64, 2. 
5 Michael Zürn, ‘The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions’ (2014) 6 European Political Science Review 
47. 
6 Vigjilenca Abazi, ‘Transparency in the Institutionalisation of Transatlantic Relations: Dynamics of Official Secrets and Access to 
Information in Security and Trade’ in Elaine Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation State: Transatlantic Relations: Data, 
Privacy and Trade Law (Springer 2018). 
7 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Robert Keohane: Political Theorist’ in Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds), Power, Interdependence, 
and Nonstate Actors in World Politics (Princeton University Press 2009) 254. 
8 Marcilio Toscano Franca-Filho and others, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights in Latin American FTAs and MERCOSUR: An 
Exploratory Agenda’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 811, 822-823. 
9 Robert O Keohane, ‘Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism’ (2012) 26 International Relations 125. 
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the solution of problems that cannot yet be precisely defined.”10 This paper explores the contribution of the 
EU institutional architecture of the new generation of EU FTAs to fundamental rights. It first relies on 
theoretical insights to explain how institutions matter for fundamental rights (Section 2). Taking as case studies 
the EU trade initiatives with Canada (CETA), the US (TTIP), Singapore (ESUFTA) and Japan (EUJEPA),11 
the chapter sheds light on major shortcomings in the mandate of treaty bodies and in internal processes of 
decision-making from a fundamental rights perspective (Section 3Finally, whilst not longing for the perfect 
model, this paper advances a series of considerations for an institutional architecture of EU FTAs that would 
adequately protect fundamental rights (Section 4). 
2. Between Old and New Treaty Bodies of EU FTAs 
The institutional architecture of EU FTAs includes, above all, the treaty bodies set out under the specific 
institutional chapters; but also other entities envisaged in the FTA, yet outside the institutional chapters. All 
the FTAs under investigation feature institutional chapters: they create and elaborate on the duties of a Joint 
Committee and also establish Specialised committees. The institutional chapters also often envisage the setting 
up of working groups and contact points, which are not examined here. With the only exception of TTIP,12 
institutional chapters do not include recently-introduced entities that institutionalise civil society in the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs: the Civil Society Forum and the Domestic Advisory Groups. These are 
part of the chapters on trade and sustainable development (TSD).13 In this overview, EUSFTA emerges as the 
most atypical FTA: it does not establish a Specialised committee on TSD, but a Board; nor does it foresee the 
creation of a committee on regulatory cooperation, chiefly because there is no chapter on that. EUSFTA is also 
the only agreement not envisaging a Civil Society Forum.  
 
Table No.1: Overview of the institutional architecture per trade agreement.14 
 
10 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press 1984) 
247. 
11 The paper is part of a PhD research and relies on the same case studies: these are Post-Lisbon new generation trade agreements that 
the EU has negotiated with advanced economies in North America and Asia. 
12 European Union’s proposal for a legal text on Institutional, General and Final Provisions in TTIP, tabled for discussion with the 
US in the negotiating round of 11-15 July 2016 and made public on 14 July 2016 (hereafter TTIP). 
13 CETA is only a partial exception to that, in that the provisions on the domestic advisory groups are to be found under the chapter 
on trade and labour and the chapter on trade and environment. 
14 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. Joint Committees: Art.26.1 CETA; Art.X.1 TTIP; Art.16.1 EUSFTA 
(this is in fact a “Trade Committee”. A Joint Committee is established under the PCA, 16.1(5) FTA referring to Art.41 PCA); 
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Joint Committees and Specialised Committees 
Joint and Specialised committees are a typical feature of EU international agreements. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that all the EU FTAs under investigation envisage the creation of a Joint Committee and a number 
of Specialised Committees.15  The Joint Committees are executive bodies formed by representatives of the EU 
and of the trade partner.16 They are co-chaired by the EU Commissioner for Trade and the partner’s Minister 
for Trade.17 Their main function is to supervise and facilitate the implementation and operation of the entire 
agreement. 18 Above all, they are the main decisional bodies within the institutional architecture of EU FTAs. 
The Specialised Committees are responsible for monitoring the implementation of specific individual chapters. 
Just like the Joint Committees, they are intergovernmental executive bodies composed of representatives of 
the Parties.19 They can be expected to work towards the achievement of the objectives of the chapters under 
their responsibility, where their functions are also specified. Whilst mainly reporting to the Joint Committee, 
and proposing draft decisions to it, the texts of EUSFTA, CETA and EUJEPA lead to believe that they can 
also take decisions themselves.20  
Table No.2: Selected decision-making powers of the Joint Committee per trade agreement.21 
 
Art.22.1 EUJEPA. Specialised Committees: Art.26.2 CETA; Art.X.3 TTIP; Art.16.2 EUSFTA; Art.22.3 EUJEPA; TSD Committees: 
Art.26.2.1(g) CETA; Art.X.3(c) TTIP (yet missing elaboration in the specific TSD chapter); Art.12.15 EUSFTA (Board on TSD); 
Art.23.3(1)(h) EUJEPA. Working Groups: Art.X.3 TTIP; Art.22.4 EUJEPA. For CETA, a slight exception is Art.5.14(4) The Joint 
Management Committee [for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures] may establish working groups comprising expert level 
representatives of the Parties, to address specific SPS issues. Contact Points: Art.26.5 CETA; Art.X.5 TTIP; Art.22.6 EUJEPA. 
Domestic Advisory Groups: Articles 23.8(4) 24.13(5) CETA; Art.X.7 TTIP; Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA; Art.16.15 EUJEPA. Civil 
Society Forum: Art.22.5 CETA; Art.X.8 TTIP; Art.16.16 EUJEPA. 
15 EUSFTA in fact establishes a Trade Committee, which is nonetheless comparable to the Joint Committees of the other FTAs. A 
Joint Committee is envisaged under its political counterpart, the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
16 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(1) TTIP, Art.16.1(1) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(1) EUJEPA.  
17 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(a) TTIP, Art.16.1(2) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(3) EUJEPA. 
18 See e.g. Art.26.3 CETA; Art.22.1(4) and 22.1(5) EUJEPA; Art.16.1(3)(a) EUSFTA. In TTIP, the Joint Committee would have also 
had specific duties in relation to regulatory cooperation. 
19 See i.a. Art.26.2(4) and Art.22.4(1) CETA; Art. 16.2(3), Art.2.15(1), Art.5.15 EUSFTA; Art.22.3(3)(b) EUJEPA. 
20 See Art.26.2(4) CETA and Art.22.3(5) EUJEPA. As regards TTIP, nothing is mentioned about the possibility for specialised 
committees to adopt decisions. It could be inferred that decision-making would remain a prerogative of the Joint Committee, without 
yet excluding the possibility for it to allocate new tasks and powers to the specialised committees. The wording in EUSFTA is 
unclear as to whether the specialised committees can take decisions themselves, or if it is the Parties who take decisions in the 
specialised committees, see Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA. Yet a series of other provisions lead to believe that specialised committees such as 
Committee on Trade in Goods would have similar powers. 
21 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. On TTIP, the power to dissolve only relates to the Specialised 
Committees that would be established by the Joint Committee and not the FTA per se. 
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Table No.3: Selected decision-making powers of Specialised Committees and their relationship with the Joint 
Committee.22 
The DAGs and the Civil Society Forum 
The new generation EU FTAs for the first time encompass a prominent civil society dimension in their 
institutional structure. The newly-created bodies for civil society reflect a renewed effort to involve it beyond 
the negotiation stage. Two main bodies stand out which increasingly institutionalise the participation of civil 
society at the implementation level: the Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs), one to be created domestically 
by each trade partner; and the Civil Society Forum (CSF), working at the bilateral level.  
The DAGs are a unique and novel feature of the Post-Lisbon trade agreements. All the FTAs under 
investigation mandate each Party to convene or establish their own new domestic advisory group, or to consult 
an already existing one.23 At the moment of writing, the EU and the respective trade partners have established 
the DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA, but not for EUSFTA.24 The DAGs consist of a small number of civil society 
representatives and permanent observers.25 With the exception of EUJEPA, all the other FTAs stipulate that 
there shall be a “balanced representation” including business, social and environmental stakeholders.26 The 
EU DAGs comprise members representing three groups: representatives of the employers, of the workers, and 
the so-called “third interests”.27 Regarding the selection process, it is the Commission that publishes the call 
for expression of interest and takes the final decision on the basis of a number of criteria.28 While the EU DAGs 
are administered by the European Economic and Social Committee and to work independently from the 
 
22 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
23 In general, provisions on the DAGs are to be found in the TSD chapters, under the heading of institutional mechanisms. EUSFTA 
and EUJEPA reflect this practice, whereas CETA is slightly different, due to the Canadian preference to have two separate DAGs: 
one for the chapter on Trade and Labour and one for the chapter on Trade and the Environment, and which are thus established 
therein. TTIP would have differed more significantly, inasmuch as it would have established the DAGs under the overarching 
institutional chapter. This way, it would have recognised them a constitutive part of the institutional architecture of the Agreement. 
As shown below, this would have also been reflected in the scope of their mandate. See Articles 23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA - 
Institutional mechanisms; Art.X.7 TTIP - Domestic Advisory Groups; Art.12.15 EUSFTA - Institutional Set up; Art.16.15 EUJEPA - 
Domestic advisory group. 
24 The statement of the non-establishment of the DAGs for EUSFTA is based on the answers received by Europe Direct by email.  
25 18 members for the EU DAG for CETA and 12 members for the EU DAG for EUJEPA. See respective rules of procedure, RoP 2.1 
EU DAG for CETA and RoP 2.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA, available at 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/final_rules_of_procedure_-_eu_dag_for_japan.pdf> and 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/en_rules_of_procedure_for_eu_dag_for_ceta_0.pdf>. 
26 Art.23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA; Art.X.7 TTIP; Art.12.15 EUSFTA. The Rules of Procedure of the EU DAG for EUJEPA 
prescribes this balanced representation.  
27 When referring to “civil society actors” of the DAGs and CFS, the paper implies these categories. When referring to civil society 
actors for fundamental rights, it is implied that the focus is on those civil society actors that can be expected to advocate for 
fundamental rights, including for instance trade unions. The accountability of civil society actors goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
28 The EU DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA were created following a call of interest to become a DAG member. The calls specify that, 
in order to become a DAG member, a candidate would have to: be non-for profit; be registered in the EU transparency register and in 
the civil society database of the Directorate General for Trade; be effectively established in the EU; and have specific expertise or 
competence on areas covered by the sustainable development chapters. The EU DAG thereof established now encompasses members 
of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and members of both business and civil society. Call for expression of 
interest for the CETA EU DAGs is available here < https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156606.pdf > and 
the one for the EUJEPA EU DAGs here <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/september/tradoc_158364.pdf>. 
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Commission, the Rules of Procedure of the EU DAGs of both CETA and EUJEPA provide that the EU 
Commission is to be systematically invited to participate in the EU DAGs meetings.29 Regarding the DAGs of 
trade partners, Canada has decided to have one DAG for labour, and one DAG on environment. Unlike for 
the Canadian DAG on environment,30 at the time of writing there is no record of the establishment of the DAG 
for labour. It is uncertain whom it encompasses, beyond those that were mentioned at the Civil Society Forum 
on 12 September 201831 and at the CSF in November 2019.32 Japan has followed Canada’s approach in having 
two different DAGs. The DAG for labour comprises the Labour Policy Council,33 which is an advisory body 
of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: albeit composed of representatives of the workers, of the 
employers and of public interest, its members are appointed by the Ministry.34 
In the absence of DAG-to-DAG meetings, the CSF is what brings together the DAGs from each Party, and in 
most cases also other members of civil society not belonging to the DAGs. Among the FTAs investigated, 
EUSFTA is the only agreement not envisaging the creation of a joint dialogue of civil society.35 CETA, TTIP 
and EUJEPA all stipulate that the CSF comprises both the DAGs of each Party and other representatives of 
civil society, following a criterion of “balanced representation.”36 The purpose of the CSF appears to be limited 
to providing a platform for deliberative discussion. They may nonetheless submit views and opinions to the 
Joint and Specialised Committees. Unlike the Joint and Specialised committees, the DAGs and the CSF are 
not decisional bodies and their role remains advisory and consultative. While they may not be understood as 
institutions in legal terms, this paper adopts an historical institutionalist perspective which has quite an 
encompassing interpretation of institutions. The next section turns to the theoretical insights that inform this 
approach and how the institutional architecture of EU FTAs matters for fundamental rights.   
3. The Relevance of Institutions to Fundamental Rights: A 
Theoretical Framework 
This paper is interested in understanding the contribution that treaty bodies could make to fundamental rights. 
In this sense, the focus is not on what shapes institutions, but rather on what institutions can shape in their turn, 
once they are created.37 Given the nature of the inquiry, this paper relies on theoretical insights of historical 
institutionalism, according to which institutions matter for they affect outcomes. Historical institutionalism 
 
29 RoP 11.1 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.1 EU DAG on EUJEPA. This is not the case for the EP, which shall be updated on the DAG 
work programme. See RoP 11.3 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.3 EU DAG on EUJEPA. 
30 See Government of Canada, ‘Canadians appointed to environment international advisory committees’, available at 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/canadian-appointed-advisory-
commitees.html> 
31 Namely Jocelyne Dubois (Director, International Department, Canadian Labour Congress, the largest trade union in Canada), and 
Derrick Hynes (President and CEO of FETCO, Federally Regulated Employers – Transportation and Communications), see 
recording of the CETA 1st Civil Society Forum Meeting (12.09.2018), available at <https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/ceta-1st-civil-
society-forum-meeting>. 
32 Among which Kelly Pike (Assistant Professor at the University of York, Canada), see Video recording of the Forum provided by 
email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements Secretariat (TCT) Global 
Affairs Canada. 
33 See presentation by Eve Päärenson (EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee), ‘EU-Japan EPA and the role foreseen for civil 
society’, available at <http://www.office.kobe-u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-
4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf> 
34 See website of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (google translated) 
<https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/roudouzenpan/roudouseisaku/index.html>. 
35 As for the other FTAs, provisions on a CSF are to be found in the TSD chapters (see Art.22.5 CETA; Art.X.8 TTIP; Art.16.16 
EUJEPA), with the exception of TTIP which establishes it under the institutional chapter (Art.X.8 TTIP Institutional Proposal).   
36 Art.22.5(2) CETA; Art.X.8(2) TTIP; Art.16.16(2) EUJEPA. This is also repeated in the Rules of Procedures of the EU DAGs for 
CETA and EUJEPA. 
37 The “why” question is what rational choice institutionalists are interested in. Rational choice institutionalism focuses on the forces 
that shape institutions, understood as the outcome of agents’ strategies; institutions are the result of deliberate choices to defend 
specific interests. See Henry Farrell, ‘The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories: Rational Choice, Historical Institutionalism, 
and Sociological Institutionalism’ in Johannes Glückler and others (eds), Knowledge and Institutions (Springer 2018) 24. 
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provides a fitting theoretical framework because of its attribution of varying policy outcomes to different 
institutional arrangements.38 Above all, an historical institutional perspective extends the range of institutions 
that are important to explaining outcomes.39 Its application to the present analysis allows to study treaty bodies 
of EU FTAs that other theories may either overlook or discard as non-institutions.  
Treaty bodies defy classic taxonomies and definitions of institutions provided by IR scholars or social 
sciences:40 they are not international institutions proper,41 nor are they informal rules and organised practices 
impacting behaviour, as assumed by sociology42 and political organisation theories.43 In a spectrum ranging 
from formal international institutions to informal rules, the treaty bodies of EU FTAs sit somewhere in the 
middle: they are formal bodies of rules which set up the stage for cooperation and exchanges, forming 
expectations with an impact on human behaviour and political action. By holding that formal institutions are 
not the only ones to matter, historical institutionalism allows a wider interpretation of what constitutes an 
institution and justifies the study of less formalised arenas.44 In this sense, it comes at hand for an analysis of 
treaty bodies that may not be understood as institutions proper. The treaty bodies of the new generation EU 
FTAs are considered here as institutions and to matter for fundamental rights. 
In order to understand how institutions matter for fundamental rights, the analysis centres on the institutional 
design of EU treaty bodies. For the purpose of this paper, institutional design is defined as comprising the rules 
that stipulate how the treaty bodies of EU FTAs are to operate in practice.45 Institutional and IR theories tell 
us that institutional design matters.46 While functionalist and power-based scholars emphasise why an 
institution features a certain institutional design,47 historical institutionalism employs a micro-level focus: it 
suggests to leverage the explanatory power of intermediating factors that may lead to a certain policy 
outcome.48 As it is too early to observe this empirically in the context of EU FTAs, rules of institutional design 
are informative of the chances for fundamental rights to be taken into consideration and protected at the 
implementation stage. They provide the basis to understand how far the treaty bodies of EU FTAs may (or 
may not) deal with fundamental rights when exercising their mandate. As a result, the institutional design is 
not regarded as a dependent variable, nor is it taken for granted.49 Instead, it is called into question and 
examined in its potential implications for fundamental rights.50  
 
38 Bulmer (n 3) 372, Farrell (n 37).  
39 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, ‘Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy’ 
(2010) 17 Review of International Political Economy 609, 629. 
40 See Hans Keman, ‘Approaches to the Analysis of Institutions’, in Bernard Steunenberg and Frans van Vught (eds), Political 
Institutions and Public Policy (Springer 1997). 
41 Robert O Keohane and others, After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Harvard 
University Press 1993); Robert O Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ (1998) 110 Foreign Policy 82. 
42 Sabine Saurugger and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Does European Integration Theory Need Sociology?’ (2010) 8 Comparative European 
Politics 1; Keman (n 40) 3. 
43 Johan P Olsen, Governing through Institution Building: Institutional Theory and Recent European Experiments in Democratic 
Organization (OUP 2010) 36. 
44 Bulmer (n 3) 369. 
45 Among issues of institutional design are i.a. whether the rules are informal or legalised, whether the commitments are permanent 
or time-bound, and whether decision-making is participatory or centralised. See Randall W Stone, ‘Institutions, Power, and 
Interdependence’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 7) 41; Helen Milner, ‘Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics: 
Research Frontiers’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 44) 20; Bartl (n 4). 
46 Barbara Koremenos and others, The Rational Design of International Institutions (CUP 2009) 762; Ronald B Mitchell, ‘The 
Influence of International Institutions: Institutional Design, Compliance, Effectiveness and Endogeneity’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 
5) 66; Randall Stone, ‘Institutions, Power, and Interdependence’, in Milner (n 45) 43. 
47 As pointed out by Charles Roger, The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, and 
Why It Matters (OUP 2020) 56. 
48 Bulmer (n 3) 376. 
49 Stone (n 45) 43; Olsen (n 43); Mitchell (n 46) 81. 
50 What this paper is not concerned with is the effectiveness of institutions, if understood in the sense that treaty bodies should 
achieve the purpose for which they were created (see e.g. Timothy J McKeown, ‘The Big Influence of Big Allies: Transgovernmental 
Relations as a Tool of Statecraft’ in Milner and Moravcsik (n 7); Stephen Woolcock, ‘EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in 
the 2000s: A Reorientation towards Commercial Aims’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 718, 726). One angle would be to consider 
potential for compliance with the TSD chapter, which is yet not the aim of this paper. This paper is also not concerned with the 
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In order to examine how treaty bodies of EU FTAs, and more specifically their institutional design, can matter 
for fundamental rights, the analysis relies on some of the elements that, according to historical institutionalism, 
influence and help understand policy outcomes. For historical institutionalism, policy outcomes are influenced 
by how institutional designs shape the preferences of the members of an institution and their behaviour and 
practices, including how they interact with each other.51 Underlying the relevance of these elements is the tenet 
whereby institutional designs create path-dependencies which will influence the course of policy and 
practices.52 Historical institutionalism predicts that most of the time, institutions will not perform efficiently, 
for they are bound by rules established in earlier times, and from which it is difficult to depart. The resulting 
policy outcomes may downgrade their usefulness or sideline new demands in their respect.53 For fundamental 
rights this could mean, inter alia, that mechanisms for their monitoring and protection would be constrained 
by existing practices, or even by omissions (and the scope for fundamental rights in EU FTAs is very limited).54  
With this in mind, the first element discussed here concerns preferences. Historical institutionalism maintains 
that institutions shape how their members will set their preferences over time.55 Preferences will be part of a 
limited menu of options provided by the creators of the institutions.56 For the present analysis, what is relevant 
is the extent to which the preferences of treaty bodies of EU FTAs encompass objectives of fundamental rights. 
The objectives that these treaty bodies have been set up to achieve will determine how the members will 
understand their role and what they will decide or discuss upon.57 In this regard, the scope of the mandate is 
taken as an element to be examined. Importantly, it has an impact on agenda-setting and outcome.58 The 
breadth and degree of clarity of the scope will determine how much discretion the members of a body will 
have as to the agenda items to be discussed. The mandate can matter for fundamental rights to the extent that 
it may expect institutions to monitor the impact of the trade agreement, or of a certain decision or policy, on 
fundamental rights, as well as to provide concrete proposals on fundamental rights. In addition, institutional 
designs that included commitments for institutions to respect fundamental rights and to endorse procedural 
good governance principles could arguably lead to more socially legitimate outcomes.59 
The second element considered here concerns internal processes. Historical institutionalism holds that 
institutional arrangements structure internal processes of decision-making and other organisational features, 
which in turn influence and help explain the policy outcome.60 In these processes, institutional design will 
reflect and reproduce particular patterns of power distribution, in what is termed the ‘distributional effect’ of 
institutions.61 As Wendt has pointed out, choices about institutional design are choices about who is 
empowered, or not, to make decisions.62 In this context, historical institutionalism holds that interactions 
within and between institutions matter.63 Hence it is important to examine the way decision-making processes 
are designed and what kind of interactions they envisage.64 For fundamental rights, the relevance lies in the 
 
incentives for such compliance, nor for creating treaty bodies (see e.g. Koremenos and others (n 46)), since the latter are taken as the 
independent variables for the implications on fundamental rights. 
51 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 369. 
52 Bulmer (n 3) 372. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Isabella Mancini, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU’s External Trade Relations: From Promotion ‘Through’ Trade Agreements to 
Protection ‘in’ Trade Agreements’ in Eva Kassoti and Ramses A Wessel (eds), EU Trade Agreements and the Duty to Respect 
Human Rights Abroad (CLEER PAPERS 2020/1). 
55 Mark Dawson, ‘Fundamental Rights in European Union Policy-making: The Effects and Advantages of Institutional Diversity’ 
(2020) 20 Human Rights Law Review 50, 54.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Bartl (n 4). 
58 Koremenos and others (n 46) 770. 
59 Olsen (n 43). 
60 Bulmer (n 3) 374. 
61 Thelen (n 51) 394 quoting Ikenberry 1994; Pierson 1997.  
62 Alexander Wendt, ‘Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design’ in Koremenos and others, 
275. See also Thelen (n 51). 
63 Dawson (n 55). 
64 Ibid. 
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extent to which internal processes provide for participation and institutional space to non-state actors and 
parliaments: not only to voice concerns related to fundamental rights, but also to interact with decisional 
bodies, if not to take part in the decision-making process themselves. This would also contribute to the 
politicisation of institutions, which can enhance the quality of decision-making65 and make it difficult to 
overlook rights-based concerns.66 As part of the examination of interactions, elements to consider include 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms: these are necessary so that preferences over fundamental rights do 
not remain abstract but are duly followed up and given reasons for not to.67  
The next section turns to explore these elements in the context of the new generation EU FTAs. It highlights 
omissions with respect to fundamental rights, above all in the preferences that the institutional design provides 
for the treaty bodies; as well as limitations in internal processes which cannot account for an institutional 
environment that can adequately safeguard fundamental rights. The layering and copy-pasting of treaty bodies 
across different FTAs, with slight differences as to civil society participation, concur with path-dependency 
predictions and outcomes that may easily ignore fundamental rights consideration and impacts. 
4. The Inadequacy of the Institutional Architecture of EU FTAs for 
Fundamental Rights 
4.1. Fundamental Rights Gaps in the Mandate of Treaty Bodies 
A comparison of the mandates of treaty bodies reveals that only labour rights would benefit from an 
institutional structure, which envisages monitoring compliance with them. As far as Joint Committees are 
concerned, their main function is to supervise and facilitate the implementation and operation of the 
agreement.68 The scope of the activities of a Joint Committee can be said to encompass all the chapters of an 
FTA.69 Even though the latter include the newly-introduced chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development 
(TSD), it is easier to imagine that the Specialised Committee on TSD will be the main body dealing with it. 
Beyond the substantive chapters to be monitored, the operation of the Joint Committees is not subject to 
principles or objectives of fundamental rights; nor do the institutional chapters feature overarching objectives 
encompassing fundamental rights. By contrast, for instance, Chapter 4 has shown that the chapters on 
regulatory cooperation in both TTIP and EUJEPA refer to the promotion of a transparent regulatory 
environment  and good regulatory practices as some of the objectives that regulatory cooperation mechanisms 
should pursue and incorporate, and which could arguably contribute to an outcome that does not jeopardise 
fundamental rights.70 Given the institutional provisions of the FTAs, however, the objectives of the Joint 
Committees appear to remain substantive and relating to the achievement of an effective operation of the entire 
FTA. 
As to the Specialised Committees, they are similarly expected to work towards the effective implementation 
of the chapters under their responsibility. Significantly, for the first time, the new generation EU FTAs 
comprise Specialised Committees on TSD: these are executive bodies whose main role is to oversee the 
implementation of the TSD chapter, which also implies ensuring compliance with the commitments 
 
65 Michael Zurn and others, ‘The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions’ (2014) 6 European Political 
Science Review 47. 
66 Dawson (n 55) 51. 
67 Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101. 
68 Only EUJEPA specifies the aim of ensuring that the Agreement “operates properly and effectively” as a basis for the allocation of 
powers to the Joint Committee, see Art.22.1(4) and 22.1(5) EUJEPA. Compare with Art.16.1(3)(a) EUSFTA “The Trade Committee 
shall ensure that this Agreement operates properly”. 
69 See e.g. Art.26.3 CETA. In TTIP, the Joint Committee would have also had specific duties in relation to regulatory cooperation. 
70 Art.18.1(1) EUJEPA and Art.x.1(1)(c) TTIP- EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation (21 March 2016). 
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undertaken. Only CETA and EUJEPA have a fully-fledged Committee on TSD.71 The EU proposal for the 
institutional chapter of TTIP refers to the establishment of a TSD Committee, which is yet not elaborated in 
the EU textual proposal for the TSD chapter.72 As far EUSFTA is concerned, the Parties are required to 
establish a Board on TSD, but besides the task of overseeing the implementation of the chapter, no further 
powers are specified;73 above all, there are no records of its establishment. By contrast, both CETA and 
EUJEPA provide that the TSD Committee will monitor the implementation of the TSD chapter and add to this 
in different ways.  
CETA contains extensive provisions on the interaction between the TSD Committee and civil society, to which 
the chapter will turn later. While CETA provides that its Specialised committees - which includes the TSD 
Committee - can propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee, the specific articles on the TSD Committee 
do not repeat this.74 EUJEPA, by contrast, assigns a wider range of powers to the TSD Committee, which 
include: the possibility to make recommendations to the Joint Committee;75 to pursue cooperation between its 
work and the activities of the ILO;76 and to seek solutions to resolve differences between the Parties regarding 
the interpretation or application of the chapter.77 Notwithstanding the slight variations, the fact remains that 
the TSD Committees remain limited in what they are essentially expected to do: monitor the effective 
implementation of the TSD Chapter. Since this is where the labour rights provisions can be found, and given 
the TSD Committees have to ensure that these commitments are abided by, their mandate can be said to 
encompass fundamental rights. Labour rights yet are only a fraction of a broader range of fundamental rights. 
EU FTAs do not contain chapters for data privacy rights, and no Specialised committee exists to monitor the 
implementation of the relevant provisions. Fundamental rights that do not enjoy a place within the FTA do not 
enjoy a treaty body, chiefly because there would be no provision to monitor.  
Importantly, however, CETA suggests that the TSD Committee may review the impact of the Agreement on 
sustainable development.78 EUJEPA includes a self-standing provision to a similar effect, albeit not addressed 
to the TSD Committee specifically, but to the Parties and the institutions set up by the Agreement.79 In both 
cases, such an assessment could include potential impacts on labour rights. Importantly, whereas the task of 
monitoring the TSD chapter would imply to ensure compliance with labour rights commitments, here the 
reference is made to the impact that the whole agreement may have on sustainable development. Different 
chapters in the FTAs might indeed have an impact on labour and other fundamental rights.80 Assessing the 
impact of an FTA on sustainable development, however, does not imply assessing the impact of an FTA on a 
 
71 For CETA it includes the TSD chapter and also the chapters on Trade and Labour and Trade and Environment. See Art.22.4 
CETA. See, respectively, Articles 23.8(2) CETA for Trade and Labour and 24.13(3) CETA for Trade and Environment. 
72 See EU textual proposal for the TSD Chapter at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf>. An 
EU position paper gives some guidance as to how this TSD Committee would have functioned: without calling it as such, the paper 
refers to a “government-to-government joint body” for the oversight and monitoring of TSD chapter implementation; this body 
would have also promoted “activities to further implement its shared objectives”, including via “decisions and recommendations”. 
EU Position Paper on Trade and sustainable Development Chapter/Labour and Environment: EU Paper outlining key issues and 
elements for provisions in the TTIP, available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153024.pdf>. 
73 Art.12.15(3) EUSFTA. The only requirement prescribes that the meetings of the Board shall include a session with stakeholders, 
making sure to have a balanced representation of relevant interests. See Art.12.15(4) EUSFTA and Art.12.15(4) EUSFTA. 
74 Nonetheless, and unlike EUJEPA, CETA provides that the TSD Committee reviews the impact of the agreement on sustainable 
development (see Art.22.4(1) CETA). This is presented as an activity falling under its function to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement and it could be expected that the TSD Committee under EUJEPA would have the same task. 
75 Art.16.13(2)(a) EUJEPA. 
76 Art.16.13(4) EUJEPA. 
77 Art.16.13(2)(e) EUJEPA. 
78 Art.22.4(1) CETA. 
79 Art.16.11 EUJEPA, “the Parties recognise the importance of reviewing, monitoring and assessing, jointly or individually, the 
impact of the implementation of this Agreement on sustainable development through their respective processes and institutions, as 
well as those set up under this Agreement.” 
80 Tonia Novitz, ‘Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Sustainable Development’?’ in 
Henner Gott (ed), Labour standards in International Economic Law (Springer 2018); Isabella Mancini, ‘Deepening Trade and 
Fundamental Rights? Harnessing Data Protection Rights in the Regulatory Cooperation Chapters of EU Trade Agreements’, in 
Wolfgang Weiss and Cornelia Furculita (eds), Global Politics and EU Trade Policy Facing the Challenges to a Multilateral 
Approach (Springer 2020). 
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wide range of fundamental rights that might be affected. While some argue that judicial review in these cases 
might lag behind in providing an effective tool,81 the Ombudsman recently made clear that the human rights 
impacts of an agreement also apply during its implementation, “in light of the human rights obligations set out 
in the Charter and in international human rights law”.82 What is now a quick reference in the text of CETA to 
engage in such review should become the object of an express duty of the TSD Committees. Arguably, the 
TSD Committees could benefit from suggestions by civil society actors, which may have familiarity with local 
fundamental problems, and which in the institutional architecture of EU FTAs are assigned a body and a role. 
While the preferences of the DAGs and of the CSF may depart from those of the Parties’, their role is mainly 
consultative and circumscribed to the oversight of the TSD chapter. The DAGs are expected to facilitate, 
monitor and provide views and advice on the implementation of the TSD Chapter.83 The role of the CSFs is to 
“conduct a dialogue”. The subject matter for this dialogue encompasses: the TSD chapter in EUJEPA; 
“sustainable development aspects of this Agreement” in CETA; and “the implementation and application of 
this Agreement” in TTIP.84 The texts of the FTAs suggest that the new bodies institutionalising civil society 
participation are not expected to monitor the impact of the FTAs on fundamental rights; nor to deliberate on 
them. The DAGs and the CSF are treaty bodies that are detailed in the TSD chapter, and which are required to 
facilitate and monitor its implementation. Yet, as discussed, fundamental rights typically remain limited to 
labour standards. Accordingly, the DAGs and the CSF will not monitor, for instance, data privacy rights in the 
context of e-commerce. Historical institutionalism suggests that the narrow scope of their mandate will have 
consequences on the agenda of their meetings, not least on what these bodies understand to be their role.  
The EU’s TTIP proposal is the only one, among the other FTAs, that would have extended the scope of the 
mandate of the DAGs and of the CSF to respectively oversight and conduct a dialogue on the implementation 
of the entire agreement.85 Similarly, EU civil society actors have recently demanded to enlarge the scope of 
the mandate to the whole agreement.86 Yet the widening of the scope does not necessarily correspond to a 
mandate that would come to aid to fundamental rights. This would be the case where civil society were asked 
to appreciate and monitor the impact of the FTA on fundamental rights, including impacts deriving from 
different chapters of the FTA. The demands to broaden the scope of the mandate were not motivated by this 
interpretation, nor have they this effect. On the motivation, demands for expanding the mandate find their 
origin in the will, by the business component of the EU DAGs, to be granted a role in the implementation of 
FTA chapters other than the one on TSD. In this regard, some civil society actors condemn the lack of a clear 
scope of action of the DAGs, as everything could be on their agenda.87 A wider agenda might indeed take away 
room for discussion on matters related to e.g. trade and labour, since other economic matters pertaining to the 
FTA could be prioritised. 
Regarding the implications, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the agreement does not mean 
monitoring its impact on something else (as could be fundamental rights); or facilitating the realisation of 
something falling outside its scope. As discussed, this is problematic in the quasi-absence of fundamental 
 
81 Marise Cremona and Joanne Scott, Introduction, in Cremona and Scott, EU Law Beyond Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of 
EU Law (OUP 2019) 19. 
82 Decision of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 506-509-674-784-927-1381/2016/MHZ against the 
European Commission concerning a human rights impact assessment in the context of the EU-Turkey Agreement. 
83 The proposal of TTIP differs from the other FTAs in that it would have extended scope of their oversight to the entire agreement. 
Art.X.7(1) EU TTIP proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions. See discussion later. 
84 Art.23.8(4) CETA; Art.X.7(1) TTIP; Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA; Art.16.15(1) EUJEPA. 
85 Art.X.7(1) EU TTIP proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions. 
86 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, ‘The role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the 
implementation of Free Trade Agreements’ (adopted 15 January 2019), available at <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-
work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/role-domestic-advisory-groups-monitoring-implementation-free-trade-agreements>; 
Non-paper of the Commission services, ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and 
Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (26 February 2018), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf> (hereafter: European Commission, ‘Non-paper’). 
87 Informal interview with civil society representatives.  
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rights in FTAs, as there would be very little to monitor in their respect. The European Commission understands 
civil society mechanisms as means for continuous analysis of the “effectiveness” of the TSD chapters.88 While 
crucial, such an understanding omits and prevents examinations of intrinsic linkages between other sections of 
the FTAs and fundamental rights. It also excludes ex-post evaluations of the negative impacts predicted in the 
ex-ante sustainability impact assessments. The methodology of the ex-post impact assessments of EU FTAs 
corroborates this observation.89 While stakeholders may be consulted, the DAGs and the CSF have no formal 
role in ex-post monitoring processes. In any case, they are not required, as per their role, to check that 
implementation of an FTA respects fundamental rights. Their duty is to ensure that the commitments of the 
Parties under the agreement are fulfilled.  
As the DAGs and the CSF are not required to monitor the impact on fundamental rights, deliberation on these 
issues also risks remaining on the margins. If treaty bodies can be understood as endeavours of 
institutionalisation in the sense of formalising and stabilising practices and cooperation, then the DAGs and 
the CSF represent unique institutionalised channels for regular meetings. Periodic interaction and horizontal 
exchanges between EU and partner countries’ civil society are likely to benefit information-sharing and can 
be conducive to policy learning and innovation.90 The experience with CETA so far shows that the CSF can 
work as a platform for dialogue on cooperation on labour standards with third FTA partners; and also as a 
springboard for joint initiatives, such as joint workshops with civil society on collective bargaining.91 The 
agenda of the EU-Canada CSF was also open to “any other issues”, albeit limited to the field of TSD. 
Particularly at this stage, civil society actors should prompt discourses on the relationship between trade and 
fundamental rights, how this relationship should be understood and the way forward. What matters eventually, 
will be that the DAGs and the CSF manage to put these issues on the agenda.  
4.2. Decision-making Processes that can Sideline Fundamental Rights 
In the implementation phase of FTAs, the Joint Committees, and in some cases the specialised committees, 
are the main bodies that can take decisions, with no oversight mechanisms being applied to them. Significantly, 
Joint Committees can take decisions that will be binding on the under international law on the Parties, as well 
as under EU law on the EU and its Member States.92 The powers of the Joint Committees appear to go beyond 
the mere executive implementation of obligations within the scope of the FTAs.93 Their decision-making 
powers encompass an indefinite range of issues with potential implications on fundamental rights.94 As more 
 
88 European Commission, ‘Non-paper’ (n 86). The Commission services consider it key to continue to engage with Member States, 
the European Parliament, interested stakeholders and the public to continuously analyse the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the TSD chapters (e.g. through review clauses; annual FTA implementation reports; ex-post impact assessments). 
89 See Elisabeth B Bonanomi, ‘Measuring Human Rights Impacts of Trade Agreements-Ideas for Improving the Methodology: 
Comparing the European Union’s Sustainability Impact Assessment Practice and Methodology with Human Rights Impact 
Assessment Methodology’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 481. 
90 Evgeny Postnikov and Ida Bastiaens, ‘Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade 
agreements’ (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy 923. 
91 European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (2019) (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: Meeting of the Civil Society 
Forum, 12 November 2019, Ottawa), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158679.pdf>. 
92 Decisions become binding under international law by virtue of their adoption by the Joint Committee, as the EU can enter into 
international commitments following the simplified procedures of Articles 218(7) and 218(9) TFEU: in the case of CETA, the 
Council decided that the former was indeed the procedure to follow for the adoption of the decisions by the CETA Joint Committee. 
For a thorough explanation, see Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional constraints and 
proposals for strengthening the European Parliament' (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 532. Decisions are binding 
under EU law as a result of Art.216(2) TFEU, read in conjunction with case law that stipulates that treaty committees’ decisions 
constitute international agreements and form part of EU law (Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European 
Communities ECLI:EU:C:1989:422; C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:1990:322). See Mario Mendez, 
The Legal Effects of EU Agreements (OUP 2013); Ramses Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of 
Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero 
(eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart 2016). 
93 Weiss (n 1) 536. 
94 Ibid.  
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political functions are being attached to executive treaty bodies,95 the internal process of decision-making 
requires political oversight by parliaments and civil society. It has been argued that insofar as authorities that 
operate beyond the State are vested with more political functions, a pressing need of legitimation necessarily 
arises.96 The examination of the rules for processes of decision-making, including how actors are to interact 
with each other, reveal that issues of fundamental rights can be easily side-lined. 
4.2.1. The Discretional Interaction with Civil Society 
Interaction with DAGs and the CSF is not compulsory and appears to remain a remote possibility. Civil society 
actors do not take part in the meetings of the Joint Committees; their function appears to remain representative 
and consultative. When looking at the texts of the FTAs, no provisions expressly provide that the Joint 
Committees are required to let civil society actors join their meetings. In some of the institutional chapters, the 
Parties recall the importance of considering the views of the public, as a way to “draw on a broad range of 
perspectives” in the implementation stage.97 However, when it comes to the functioning of the Joint Committee 
more specifically, the institutionalisation of interactions with the public is nearly absent. 
 
Image No.1: Interactions of the Joint Committee with non-state actors per FTA.98 
CETA and EUSFTA stipulate that the Joint Committee may communicate with all interested parties, including 
the private sector and civil society organisations.99 In EUJEPA, the Joint Committee may provide information 
to the public, which yet suggests a debriefing opportunity, rather than an actual communication or exchange.100 
Only TTIP clearly mandates that the Joint Committee meet with the Civil Society Forum.101 The participants 
of the first meeting of the CETA Joint Committee were limited to the Canadian Minister for Trade, the EU 
Commissioner for Trade, delegations, the contact points and representatives from the EU MS and Canadian 
Provinces and Territories.102 The agenda of the meeting omitted any interaction or ex-post debrief session with 
civil society. The same occurred at the first meeting of the Joint Committee under EUJEPA.103 As to EUSFTA, 
no meetings appear to have taken place so far.104 
 
95 Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA in the EU: Challenges for democracy and executive-legislative institutional balance due to 
the limited role of the European Parliament in the treaty bodies’ decision-making’ (paper presented at CETA Implications 
Conference CETA Implementation and Implications Project (CIIP), 27-28 September 2019, University Hall, Dalhousie University) 
(hereafter Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’) 7. 
96 Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zürn, ‘Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?’ (2012) 50 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 137; Zürn and others, ‘International authority and its politicization’ (2012) 4 International Theory 69. 
97 Art.X.1(8) TTIP and Art.16.6 EUSFTA. TTIP also adds that this is relevant in the context of the domestic advisory groups and the 
Civil Society Forum, see Art.X.1(8) TTIP.  
98 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
99 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art.16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. 
100 Art.22.1(5)(c) EUJEPA. 
101 Art.X.1(9) TTIP. 
102 See European Commission, ‘Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Meeting of the Joint Committee, 
26 September 2018, Montreal (Canada), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157470.pdf> 
103 See European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Japan-EU EPA Joint Committee, 10 April 2019, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_157971.pdf>. 
104 No documents are available, see <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-singapore-agreement/index_en.htm>. 
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A slightly different picture emerges for the Specialised Committees. Regarding the TSD Committees, 
CETA is replete with provisions for exchanges with civil society. The CETA TSD Committee is expected to 
“promote transparency and public participation” and to publish any decision or report it produces;105 to hold a 
session with the public to discuss the implementation of the chapter;106 and to present updates on 
implementation to the Civil Society Forum, including annual reports as to its follow-ups on these 
communications.107 EUJEPA provides that one of the functions of the TSD Committee is to interact with civil 
society but does not elaborate further on this.108 In EUJEPA, it is up to the Parties to give information on the 
implementation of the TSD chapter to the Joint Dialogue with civil society.109 Beyond the TSD Committees, 
an additional comparison can be made with the specialised committees for Regulatory Cooperation. In the 
relevant chapter, CETA allows civil society to provide input, but not to join the meetings of the Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum. Nonetheless, the meeting in December 2018 ended with a “stakeholders debrief session” 
which “registered stakeholders” could attend.110 By contrast, no such debrief session was foreseen or took 
place at the first meeting of the EUJEPA Regulatory Cooperation Committee.111  
The existence of requirements to interact with civil society yet is not the same as making those actors 
observers or true participants of the meetings. CETA lacks provisions to that effect. Still, at the end of its 
meetings, the CETA TSD Committee has so far carried “meeting reviews” with civil society representatives 
belonging to the DAGs.112 The review includes a debrief session, where the TSD Committee informs the DAGs 
of its discussions;113 views are then exchanged with the DAGs chairs, which allows them to provide feedback 
to the TSD Committee’s work plan, to present their Joint Statement, and to inform the TSD Committee on the 
discussions at the Civil Society Forum.114 Conversely, once again, the first meeting of the EUJEPA TSD 
Committee held no dedicated sessions with civil society.115 What emerges from this picture is that the disparity 
across trade agreements in what they provide as to external participation is also reflected in the role of civil 
society in the implementation process. Still, CETA is an exemplary case of effort and best practices going 
beyond what is provided under the agreement itself. The late politicisation of its negotiation has prompted 
huge interest by many civil society actors in scrutinising its implementation. Civil society actors seem to have 
welcomed the transparency practices by the CETA specialised committees.116 Considering that such best 
practices have not triggered in the context of EUJEPA, it could be questioned how these informal practices 
left to the discretion of the Parties compare with what could be a legally-embedded and more meaningful 
 
105 Art.22.4(4)(a) CETA. 
106 Art.22.4(3) CETA. 
107 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
108 Art.16.13(2)(c) EUJEPA. 
109 Art.16.16(4) EUJEPA. 
110 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (1st Meeting of the CETA Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 14 December 2018) 4, available at < 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. See also European Commission, ‘CETA Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
– Stakeholder Debrief Meeting’ (4 February 2020), available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. 
111 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on 
Regulatory Cooperation, 20 January 2020, Video Conference), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158579.pdf>. 
112 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 September 2018 Brussels), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157266.pdf>; and European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting 
of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/november/tradoc_158424.11.19%20(for%20publication).pdf>.  
113 Ibid.  
114 European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>. 
115 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on Trade 
and Sustainable Development, 29-30 January 2020, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158594.pdf>. 
116 The EU Commission has gradually come to recognise the advantages of interacting with civil society actors, as those who have 
knowledge and information on the ground, thus supporting a bottom-up approach to the implementation of EU FTAs. See European 
Commission, ‘Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): 1st Meeting of the CETA Regulatory Cooperation 
Forum, 14 December 2018, Brussels and by videoconference), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/february/tradoc_157679.pdf>. 
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participation in the actual meetings. Such participation would not be meaningful in the absence of follow-up 
mechanisms. Yet in the FTAs at hand this is the case. 
4.2.2. Absence of Follow-up Mechanisms 
Unlike the Joint and Specialised committees, the DAGs and the CSF do not have decision-making powers. 
They can nonetheless “submit views and recommendations” on their own initiative.117 What is interesting for 
the present exploration is to examine how these views are followed up. The interactions with the Joint and 
Specialised committees would be futile if the views and recommendations of civil society actors were not 
followed up. Internal processes of decision-making could still sideline fundamental rights. In this context, 
accountability mechanisms are considered here to enhance the chances for the demands of the DAGs and CSF 
to find their way into the policy process, and the extent to which the executive bodies would feel obliged to 
take them into account.118 Formal feedback mechanisms whereby the Joint and Specialised Committees had to 
explain which inputs were used and which were not would be an example.119 Arguably, the shorter the reporting 
chain from one treaty body to another, the better for accountability and organisational efficiency. It will be 
shown that while FTAs might envisage a certain procedure, the actual practice has developed otherwise and 
inconsistently across trade partners. The resulting organisational confusion inevitably creates accountability 
concerns and risks creating dysfunctional path-dependencies. 
The views of the DAGs and of the CSF are subject to different rules, which are to be found respectively in the 
Rules of Procedure and in the trade agreement. As for the DAGs, the Rules of Procedure of the EU DAGs for 
CETA and EUJEPA are similar: views can be expressed in recommendations and/or communications adopted 
by consensus;120 these views then may be submitted to a series of bodies: from the TSD Committee, to the 
Parties to the Agreement, EU institutions, the trade-partner DAG and any other relevant body.121 The DAGs 
can decide who the target for their recommendations will be. EUSFTA is the only agreement that expressly 
stipulates that the DAGs may submit their recommendations directly to the Parties.122 It does not, however, 
establish a CSF. As for the CSF, different FTAs provide different modalities of interaction. The image below 
shows the interactions of the CSF, the TSD Committee and the Joint Committee as provided by the texts of 
the trade agreements. It highlights the extension of the reporting chain before the outcome of the CSF 
deliberations arrive at the main decision-makers, i.e. the Joint Committee and/or the Parties.  
 
117 Ibid. In EUJEPA, this is not expressly mentioned, but it can be expected that the DAGs would have similar opportunities to do so. 
To submit such recommendations, a DAG adopts declarations which have to be consented to and voted by its members.  
118 Lore Van Den Putte, ‘Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work Agenda’ (2015) 6 Global Labour Journal 
221, 225-226. 
119 Ibid.  
120 See e.g. RoP 6.1 and 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.4 EU DAG for EUJEPA.  
121 RoP 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA. CETA also expressly mentions the Panel of Experts and the Civil 
Society Forum. Since both are bodies that are also created under EUJEPA, it may be expected that “any other relevant body” 
encompasses them as well. 
122 Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA. 
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Image No.2: Interactions between different treaty bodies as per the text of the trade agreements. 
The visualisation reveals that the shortest route for the CSF to the Parties is provided in CETA: here, the views 
of the DAGs and other civil society actors can be presented directly to the Parties.123 Similarly, under TTIP, 
the CSF would have directly met with the Joint Committee.124 EUJEPA creates the longest route: the CSF can 
submit opinions and views to the TSD Committee first,125 which in turn may make recommendations or 
propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee.126 These institutional designs can be compared with the EU 
AAs with Ukraine and Moldova: here, the Civil Society Platforms can submit recommendations directly to the 
Association Council, which is the corresponding body of the Joint Committee in FTAs.127 However, looking 
at the operation of these treaty bodies on the ground, it emerges that the FTAs provide only a starting point for 
how different bodies may interact, leaving a wide margin of discretion as to who can report what, to whom and 
when.  
In the context of CETA, representatives of the DAGs have so far taken part in the CSF and then reported to 
the TSD Committee the following day, during the last sessions of the TSD committee meetings: they have 
informed the TSD committee of the CSF discussions, presented their joint statement, and given feedback. 
While this would suggest that the TSD Committee and the CSF as a whole have not interacted directly, in fact 
the TSD Committee has presided over the CSF, which means a chance for it to become acquainted with the 
views raised by civil society. The CSF in any case seems to work as a background platform where different 
issues are discussed, before these are presented to the TSD Committee by the DAGs Co-Chairs. Following the 
Rules of Procedure, the CETA Joint Committee will be informed by the Specialised committees on the 
 
123 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
124 Which is co-chaired by a representative of DG Trade and the trade partner’s Trade Minister. See Art.X.1(9) TTIP Institutional 
chapter. 
125 Art.16.16(4) EUJEPA. 
126 Articles 16.13(2)(a) and 22.3(5) EUJEPA. 
127 Art.443 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, 4. 
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conclusions of the meetings of the TSD Committees.128 It can be hoped that the TSD Committee will also 
report on its discussions with the DAGs, and will thus inform the Joint Committee about civil society’s 
opinions.  
In the context of EUJEPA, the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society has followed a different path. The agenda of 
its first meeting envisaged that “participants of civil society” exchanged views directly with “representatives 
of the EU Commission and the Government of Japan.”129 While it can be expected that civil society comprised 
the DAGs of each side,130 it is not clear whether the representatives of the Parties were members of the TSD 
Committee, as provided by the text of EUJEPA. Beyond the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society, the first meeting 
of the EU-Japan TSD Committee did not include any exchange of views with the DAGs Co-chairs - unlike the 
practice developed for CETA.131 However, both sides reassured that the views expressed by the DAGs on the 
implementation of the TSD chapter “would be duly received.”132 The TSD Committee also decided on a 
number of issues related to the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society: among others, that the Dialogue would be 
organised by the TSD Committee and be held back-to-back with the TSD Committee; and that its minutes 
would be made publicly available.133 As the minutes have not been published,134 it is not possible to assess 
whether the views voiced at the Joint Dialogue have influenced the decisional bodies. Furthermore, unlike 
CETA, the specialised committees are not required to report to the Joint Committee on the conclusions of their 
meetings.135 No follow-up requirements are demanded to the Joint Committee, nor to the TSD Committee.  
CETA is the only FTA which expressly requires the TSD Committee to report back to the CSF on the follow-
up to the views of civil society presented to the Parties.136 This unique provision can be expected to enhance 
accountability and reason-giving processes. It must still be seen, however, how it will be used. So far, the 
Rules of Procedures of the Joint and Specialised committees are silent on the matter. Furthermore, as the 
recordings of the Forum discussions have not been made publicly available, but only its summaries,137 it is not 
easy to assess the Joint Committee’s measures vis-a-vis civil society’s demands. Importantly, the TSD 
Committee itself could also propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee. This seems to have been the case 
for the three recommendations (on SMEs, climate and gender) that the Joint Committee adopted at its first 
meeting, and which the TSD Committee reports to have prepared in the framework of the work on TSD 
implementation.138 Absent the report of the first EU-Canada CSF meeting, it is not possible to draw a causal 
relation between the Forum discussions and the above-mentioned recommendations. Some members of civil 
society in fact denounce the aleatory targeting of certain issues, which conceal and prevent progress on other 
 
128 RoP 14 Council decision (EU) 2018/1062 of 16 July 2018 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within 
the CETA Joint Committee established by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the CETA Joint 
Committee and specialised committees, OJ L 190/13 (27.7.2018). 
129 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Trade And Sustainable Development Joint Dialogue with Civil Society, 31 january 2019), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158578.pdf>. 
130 See presentation by Eve Päärendson, EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee, at <http://www.office.kobe-
u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf>. 
131 See Joint Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development under the Agreement between the 
European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (Tokyo, 29-30 January 2020), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158664.pdf>. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid.  
134 See list of ‘EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) - Meetings and documents’ currently available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2042>.  
135 See RoP of the EU-Japan Joint Committee, Decision No 1/2019 of 10 April 2019 of the Joint Committee of the EU-Japan EPA 
[2019/1035] OJ L167/81 (24.6.2019); compare with RoP 14(3) of the EU-Canada Joint Committee (n 162). 
136 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
137 With the exception of the recording of the first meeting of the EU-Canada CSF on 12 September 2018 (see EU-Canada Civil 
Society Forum: Trade and Sustainable Development under CETA at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/events/index.cfm?id=1901>) 
and the joint statements by the DAGs, see “Joint Statement of the Canadian and European Domestic Advisory Groups” mentioned at 
the Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable development (Ottawa, 13 November 2019), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>.  
138 See European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, Brussels, 13 
September 2018), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157409.pdf>. 
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more pressing (“the real”) issues.139 Eventually, the CETA TSD Committee remains free to set its own agenda 
and decide which recommendations it may make to the Joint Committee.140 
Against this backdrop, it is argued here that the DAGs and the CSF are not the only organs that can influence 
the internal processes of decision-making. The European Parliament should be able to exercise political control 
and influence the agenda in a way that reflects citizens’ concerns. Its involvement could ensure that the 
democratic quality of EU external trade does not stop at the negotiation and conclusion of FTAs, but continues 
throughout their implementation. As the next section shows, however, the EP does not enjoy a formal place 
within the institutional architecture, nor within the process of decision-making.  
4.2.3. The Relegation of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament is absent from the bodies of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs. The EP is an 
already-existing institution and would not be the output of some provisions within the FTAs. Still, one would 
expect that, especially in light of its empowerment during the negotiation process, it was granted a place in the 
implementation stage as well. This expectation becomes stronger when considering the EU Association 
Agreements, which provide an insightful, existing alternative institutional design.141 For example, the EU-
Ukraine AA foresees a Parliamentary Association Committee, composed of members of the EP and of the 
Ukrainian Parliament.142 Significantly, this body would have a series of powers: to request information on the 
AA implementation to the Association Council, the corresponding body of the Joint Committee in FTAs; to 
be informed of decisions and recommendations; to make recommendations itself directly to the Association 
Council; and to create Parliamentary Association sub-committees.143  
Exceptionally, the EU proposal for the institutional chapter of TTIP would have emphasised the importance 
of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD). This Dialogue would have not constituted a treaty body 
proper of the agreement, yet it longed to “foster the parliamentary dimension” of the Agreement.144 Although 
this is unique in the history of EU FTAs, and it may have well enhanced the involvement of the parliaments 
from both sides, there are no provisions providing an express role for the TLD in the work of the Joint or 
Specialised Committees. The place that the TLD would occupy in the operation of the Agreement thus remains 
unclear. By contrast, the TTIP proposal for regulatory cooperation of 2015 included a placeholder on the 
interaction of the RCB with legislative bodies.145   
Not only does the EP not enjoy a place within the institutional architecture. It is also relegated in decision-
making processes. None of the FTAs gives parliaments a say in decision-making by the Joint Committee. 
Compared to civil society actors, the EP also enjoys a less privileged place in the meetings of the Joint 
Committee: while some FTAs provide that the Joint Committee may communicate with civil society, nothing 
is mentioned about parliaments.146 As decision-making remains a prerogative of intergovernmental bodies, a 
clear imbalance emerges between the strong executive presence and the lack of parliamentary involvement. 
This may come as no surprise since external relations have historically pertained to the executive, and the 
 
139 Informal interview with representative of civil society. 
140 RoP 8 of the CETA Joint Committee, to be read in conjunction with RoP 14(4). 
141 See i.a. Art.121 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina AA (Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, OJ L 164, 30.6.2015, p.2); Art.440 EU-
Moldova AA (Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p.4); Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA 
(Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 
161/3, 29.5.2014). 
142 Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA. 
143 Art.468 EU-Ukraine AA. 
144 Art.X.6 TTIP. 
145 Art.14(6) TTIP proposal for regulatory Cooperation 2015. 
146 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art.16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. 
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implementation of trade agreements at the international level is not a task for parliaments.147 However, this 
should not lead to the conclusion that parliaments can be excluded from this stage and in the decision-making 
processes that follow. Above all, a key role of parliaments is to scrutinise and control the work of the executive. 
Insofar as trade agreements deepen and politicise, the traditional domination of the executive becomes 
increasingly obsolete. Yet what we see in the implementation of EU FTAs is not a trend of more prominent 
role being granted to parliaments. 
The lack of parliamentary scrutiny of decision-making by treaty bodies is blatant on the EU side. In most third 
Parties the parliaments eventually come into play for passing implementing legislation.148 By contrast, the 
internal procedures at the EU level may easily sideline the EP. What follows explains how this can be so, by 
looking at the ex ante and ex post control mechanisms that the EP can exercise in the decision-making processes 
by treaty bodies: not only bilaterally (within the Joint Committee), but also domestically (at the EU level). The 
image below visualises the EP’s limitations in monitoring the executive at the bilateral and domestic level, 
both before and after a Joint Committee takes a decision. 
 
Image No.3: EP’s limitations in decision-making.149 
In the early life-cycle of a treaty body decision, the EP lacks ex ante scrutiny powers, both at the bilateral and 
EU level. Bilaterally, the EP does not take part in the meetings of the treaty bodies and has no right to be 
informed. The Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission opens up the possibility for the EP 
to be invited to the meetings of bodies set up by multilateral agreements, which yet fails to capture bilateral 
FTAs.150 At the meetings of the Joint or specialised committees, the representatives of the Parties may find 
agreement on a decision. Yet before a decision is adopted at the bilateral level, the Council has to endorse the 
position to be taken on behalf of the Union within the treaty body. This is the step at the EU level where the 
EP is not involved and cannot exercise ex ante control. Following the simplified procedure of Article 218(9) 
TFEU, when a treaty body is called upon to adopt “acts having legal effects”,151 the Council shall rely on a 
proposal of the Commission to adopt a decision; this decision will represent the position to be taken by the EU 
 
147 Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’ (n 95) 5. 
148 Bart Kerremans and others, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world’ (2019) (Study requested by INTA 
Committee).  
149 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
150 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (OJ L304/47, 20.11.2010) 
26. 
151 With the exception of “acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement”, requiring ordinary 
legislative procedure. For a thorough discussion of Article 218(9) TFEU see Alan Dashwood, ‘EU Acts and Member State Acts in 
the Negotiation, Conclusion and Implementation of International Agreements’ in Marise Cremona and Claire Kilpatrick (eds), EU 
Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations (OUP 2018); and Joni Heliskoski, ‘The Procedural Law of International Agreements: A 
Thematic Journey through Article 218 TFEU’ (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 79. 
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negotiator within that treaty body.152 Via another simplified procedure, set out in Article 218(7) TFEU, the 
Council may directly authorise the Commission to approve amendments to an FTA by a treaty body. Together, 
these articles have been said to constitute “special regimes” whereby EU secondary law is adopted within 
treaty bodies.153  
Neither of these “special regimes” grant a say to the EP. Dawson has shown that the ordinary legislative 
procedure carries advantages for fundamental rights protection since it allows articulating fundamental rights 
arguments “that other forms of EU governance may not”.154 By contrast, fundamental rights may be neglected 
when policies are managed outside this procedure, “through institutional forms that lack the checks and 
balances the ordinary legislative process entails.”155 Given the EP’s lack of say in these special regimes, in its 
rules of procedure, the EP carved out the possibility of issuing recommendations on the proposed positions.156 
This shows an awareness of its lack of say in this process and an attempt to assert its role. At the same time, 
however, its recommendations would remain unilateral actions. The Commission would be under no duty to 
take them into account. On the other hand, while the EP has no right to be informed about the discussions of 
the treaty bodies, one can expect its right to be “immediately and fully informed”, as per Article 218 TFEU, to 
apply also at this domestic stage.157 As suggested by Weiss, a more meaningful control by the EP would involve 
a consent requirement before the Council adopts the position - something which could be enshrined in the 
Council’s decision approving the FTA.158  
After a position at the EU level is endorsed, the EP is absent once again at the bilateral level when a decision 
is adopted. Joint and Specialised committees take decisions by consensus.159 The EP has no formal role in the 
adoption of decisions. The power to take decisions exclusively rests on the executive intergovernmental bodies 
and defies parliamentary oversight. From an EU perspective, the dual source of democratic legitimacy, based 
on the representation by both the Council and the EP, is thereby compromised.160 It has been suggested that 
the EP should be made part of the representatives of the EU within the treaty bodies, or at least be granted an 
observer status and be informed throughout the process.161  
Once a decision at the bilateral level is adopted, the EP’s control mechanisms are again quite limited. At the 
EU level, the EP is not implicated when the decisions do not require ratification. All the trade agreements 
 
152 This procedural legal basis was employed recently for the decisions by the Joint Committee of CETA (see European Commission, 
‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the CETA Joint Committee 
established under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of a decision setting out the administrative and organisational 
matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal’ COM(2019) 457 final, 2019/0217 (NLE), Brussels, 11.10.2019) and by 
a Working Group of the EU-South-Korea FTA, see  Council Decision (EU) 2019/845 of 17 May 2019 on the position to be taken on 
behalf of the European Union, within the Working Group on Geographical Indications established by the Free Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, as regards the 
adoption of its rules of procedure (OJ L 138/84, 24.5.2019). For legal basis justification, see European Commission, “Proposal for a 
COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union, in the Working Group on Geographical 
indications set up by the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part, as regards the adoption of its rules of procedure” (COM/2019/181 final). 
153 Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 541. 
154 Dawson (n 55) 73. This is not to suggest that ordinary legislative procedure should apply in this case, but to provide an example 
of how other procedures may lack the checks and balances that would ensure that fundamental rights are not neglected.  
155 Ibid.  
156 Rule 109: Provisional application or suspension of the application of international agreements or establishment of the Union's 
position in a body set up by an international agreement. 
157 Article 218(10) TFEU. 
158 If the treaty body decision amounts to rule-making which interferes with tasks of the European Parliament, see Weiss, 
‘Implementing CETA’ (n 95) 16. 
159 See i.a. Art.26.4(3) and Art.26.2(4) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(3) EUSFTA; Art.22.2(3) and Art.22.3(3)(e) EUJEPA. 
160 Thomas Verellen, ‘On Conferral, Institutional Balance and Non-binding International Agreements: The Swiss MoU Case’ (2016) 
1 European Papers 1225 (Insight). 
161 Weiss (n 95); Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega‐Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law 
(2013) 23 Constellations 58; Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 625.  
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under investigation stipulate that the decisions will be binding upon the Parties.162 While the status of these 
decisions in EU law is disputed and controversial,163 what becomes problematic for the present argument is 
that in this process, even in the absence of direct effect, these decisions are liable to have legal effects on the 
EU legal order “without any subsequent act of adoption by the Union’s institutions”.164 The EP would remain 
outside this process. It has been suggested that the EP be given the possibility to suspend the decision.165 At 
the same time, bilaterally, the EP’s control powers are limited to its own-developed monitoring mechanisms, 
which would supervise the implementation of the decision and the FTA more broadly.166  
Overall, the EP’s role in the implementation phase has remained low profile. This is in stark contrast with the 
EP’s recently enhanced involvement in the negotiation and conclusion of EU FTAs, often praised for having 
enhanced the democratic quality of EU external trade. Yet an FTA does not stop at its entry into force. 
Implementation is a crucial phase in its life-cycle.167 The lack of parliamentary say during the implementation 
of an FTA goes to the detriment of the dual source of EU democratic legitimacy.168 Furthermore, an enhanced 
role during trade negotiations means the EP will be held responsible to meet its constituencies’ expectations.169 
The EP is the only institution that could exercise political control and have a formal say in the process of 
decision-making, but from which it is yet excluded, both at the EU and bilateral level. An additional layer to 
this would be judicial review by the CJEU, which can exercise ex-post scrutiny over decisions of EU FTAs 
bodies, which are subject to its jurisdiction as legal acts adopted within the frame of EU legal acts, i.e. EU 
FTAs.170 Yet this would only be ancillary to an institutional architecture that should incorporate safeguards to 
create a sort of ‘harm-proof’ institutional environment in the first place.171  
5. Designing an Institutional Architecture for Fundamental Rights 
The analysis of the institutional design of EU FTAs informs as to the extent to which the institutional 
architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to safeguard and promote fundamental rights. Following the theoretical 
framework, and with a view to understanding the implications of a certain institutional design for the outcome, 
in this case fundamental rights, this paper has focused on the mandate of the treaty bodies and on the 
interactions and accountability mechanisms of the decision-making processes. A series of limitations have 
been found, which lead to believe that, with the exception of labour rights, the implementation of EU FTAs 
may easily overlook fundamental rights. Not only the preferences set up for the treaty bodies are narrow-
sighted from a fundamental rights perspective - this may shape the preferences of the members of the 
institutions, how they understand their role, and eventually what they will discuss at their meetings. For the 
Joint Committees, this means they may neglect the relevance of fundamental rights of the decisions they take, 
because their role is to facilitate the implementation of the FTA; whereas for the DAGs and the CSF this means 
 
162 Art.26.4(2) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA; 22.2(1) EUJEPA 
163 Ramses Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other 
Bodies in the European Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times 
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164 See Joni Heliskoski, casenote on Case 370/07, Commission v. Council (2011) Common Market Law Review 555, 557-558. 
165 Weiss ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 552. 
166 Laura Puccio and Roderick Harte, ‘The European Parliament’s Role in Monitoring the Implementation of EU Trade Policy’ in 
Olivier Costa (ed), The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis (Palgrave 2019). 
167 Patrick Leblond, ‘Making the Most of CETA: A Complete and Effective Implementation Is Key to Realizing the Agreement's Full 
Potential’ (2016) CIGI Papers No. 114, 30 October 2016. 
168 Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 552. 
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170 See Articles Art.218(11), 263, 267 TFEU. 
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after. For a discussion on the limits of CJEU judicial review of trade agreements in matters of fundamental rights see Katarzyna 
Szepelak, Judicial Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU Trade Relations – Where do we 
stand today?’ in Eva Kassoti and Ramses A Wessel (eds), EU Trade Agreements and the Duty to Respect Human Rights Abroad 
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they may not discuss issues on fundamental rights other than labour rights. The analysis has shown that, even 
where such discussion may occur and the DAGs and the CSF be given the chance to present them to the 
decisional bodies, the rules for decisions-making defy monitoring and accountability mechanisms, vis-a-vis 
civil society as much as the EP. In this context, it is hard to see how fundamental rights will be the consequent 
policy outcome.  
First, regarding the gaps in the mandate, it is important that fundamental rights are embedded in the general 
objectives of the institutions, or in their specific tasks. Regarding the tasks of the institutions, it should be clear 
what their role would have to be in relation to fundamental rights. Above all, the mandates of the DAGs should 
include ongoing on-the-ground monitoring of the impact that the FTA may have on fundamental rights. 
Dedicated sessions during the CSF meetings should include exchanges on these issues and should result in 
concrete proposals to be advanced to Joint and Specialised committees. At the moment, the DAGs and CSF 
do not provide a platform with a clear mandate for monitoring fundamental rights. Implementation of EU FTAs 
is limited to what can be found therein. It remains at the discretion of the actors engaged in those bodies 
whether to add initiatives going beyond the scope of the FTAs. CETA shows that under best practices of 
transparency and regular exchanges with civil society, this could be possible. As discussed, however, it still 
has to be seen whether discussions will touch upon issues relating to fundamental rights, and whether they will 
reach the agenda of the decisional treaty bodies. Not only new initiatives for fundamental rights could come 
forward, but also policy space for deliberation could emerge.172 Importantly, the new treaty bodies that 
institutionalise the involvement of civil society are unique in their effect of enabling dialogue on a series of 
issues related to trade. Research has shown that horizontal dialogues between EU and partner countries’ civil 
society have great value in themselves.173 EU trade union representatives, for instance, attach a lot of 
importance to maintaining a dialogue with the trade unions of the trade partner, because these are the ones who 
have the knowledge of the situation in those countries.174 The mandate of the DAGs and CSF should 
accordingly put more emphasis on exploring the normative relationships between trade and fundamental rights, 
so as to trigger discussions thereon and lead to new policy outcomes.  
Second, the institutional structure of EU FTAs showcases the distributive effects of institutions. The EU is 
increasingly forcing and forging new entities that appear to streamline civil society participation, and also 
opening up venues for civil society actors to provide their views and opinions. Yet the DAGs and the CSF 
have been conceived above all as ad hoc advisory bodies. They remain much less formalised and on the margin 
than other treaty bodies for the implementation of EU FTAs. Their absence from the chapters on institutional 
provisions clearly hints at this. At the same time, the “institutional layering” - namely the addition, as opposed 
to the improvement, of the interactions with already existing institutions175 - has resulted in the creation of too 
many entities and mechanisms: they have overcrowded the institutional architecture of EU FTAs and 
“fatigued” participation by interested parties.176 DAGs have been created for each FTA, but the coordination, 
organisational and financial consequences only realised at a later stage.177 The Joint Committee for EUJEPA 
has recognised that “there exist many frameworks for policy dialogues” and recommended different bodies 
seek “synergies”.178  Members of the DAGs harshly criticise not being informed about proposals and their lack 
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Space’, in Alec Stone Sweet and others (eds), The institutionalization of Europe (OUP 2001). 
173 Van Den Putte (n 118). 
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of involvement throughout the process.179 All this has arguably an impact on participation of those representing 
citizens.  
Most importantly, what emerges is a stark contrast between centralisation of decision-making powers by the 
Joint Committees and dispersion of decision-takers. When it comes to processes of decision-making, neither 
civil society or the EP have a say. They do not take part in the meetings of the Joint and Specialised 
Committees, but only interact with them in differing and confusing formats. As shown, the interactions 
between civil society and the committees are highly inconsistent and discretional across FTAs. Participation 
of civil society has been fragmented across several venues, exacerbating coordination to advance 
recommendations to other bodies.180 Chances for fundamental rights to be discussed would be enhanced by 
allowing the EP and civil society representatives to be present at the meetings of the treaty bodies. As to the 
EP, its gradual empowerment in external trade should be extended to the implementation stage, by providing 
it with a body or platform to engage. Arguably, to the extent that the EP and civil society actors were made 
formal members of those bodies, they could operate as a check on the work of executive bodies and provide a 
means of political control.  
A final point indeed concerns accountability mechanisms. The Joint Committees can take binding decisions, 
which may have implications for fundamental rights, without having to account to the EP or civil society.181 
Even though civil society can interact with the Joint and Specialised Committees and submit views, no 
accountability mechanisms are in place requiring the Joint or Specialised committees to follow up on their 
comments or recommendations.182 Most problematic, it is not clear how issues raised would possibly be filtered 
and selected in the context of a multitude of insights. The most recent CETA CSF is a clear example of this. 
One can hardly conclude that the outcome of the deliberations will be translated into recommendations or other 
measures. The annex to the EU textual proposal for regulatory cooperation in TTIP on the institutional set up 
is illuminating in this respect: it identifies “political accountability”, “effective coordination” and 
“transparency” as essential elements for the institutional set-up of regulatory cooperation activities.183 It 
recognises that an institutional architecture requires some normative, “good governance” anchors. Attaching 
these principles to the institutional chapters of EU FTAs would enhance democratisation, as an ongoing 
endeavour;184 it would mean designing and institutionalising processes that are informed by aims of democratic 
governance, as opposed to policy effectiveness.185 In the light of no institutionalised democratic procedures 
for decision-making,186 the scholarship on Global Administrative Law could represent a useful benchmark that 
could be employed as overarching objectives for the institutional chapters and for decision-making processes: 
it provides mechanisms, practices and principles, such as transparency, participation, reasoned decision, 
legality and effective review of rules and decisions that could be applied to decision-making processes.187 
 
179 See i.a. intervention by Lina Carr (ETUC) and Tanja Buzek (EESC) at Civil Society Forum November 2019. Video recording of 
the Forum provided by email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements 
Secretariat (TCT) Global Affairs Canada. The recording is not available online. 
180 Potjomkina (n 176). 
181 See on this Jan Orbie and others, ‘Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil society mechanisms in EU 
trade agreements’ (2016) 1 Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 526. On the methodological challenges see Jennifer Zerk, 
‘Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements’ (2019) (Chatham House Research Paper). 
182 Recently, the Commission has included “Follow-up mechanisms in place with regular feedback from the domestic advisory 
groups;” as one of the aims of its ‘Support to civil society participation in the implementation of EU trade agreements’, see Annex 13 
to Commission Implementing Decision on the 2017 Annual Action programme for the Partnership Instrument of 22.5.2017, 
C(2017)3311 final. 
183 Annex to the TTIP European Union’s proposal for the Chapter on “Regulatory Cooperation”. 
184 Jonathan W Kuyper, ‘Global democratization and international regime complexity’ (2013) 20 European Journal of International 
Relations 620.  
185 De Búrca (n 67) 131. 
186 Steven Wheatley, ‘A Democratic Rule of International Law’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 525, 535. 
187 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 15, 17. 
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The contribution of an institutional architecture to fundamental rights lies in creating institutions with a 
mandate to monitor and assess the impact on fundamental rights; in creating policy space for horizontal 
exchanges on local fundamental rights issues; and in creating an institutional environment where procedures 
for decision-makers are subject to accountability and monitoring mechanisms. An examination of the 
institutional architecture of the EU FTAs reveals a series of omissions that do not fulfil these needs. The design 
of the institutional architecture of the new generation EU FTAs lags behind in creating an institutional 
environment where fundamental rights can be protected. The present evaluation reveals that the EU is leading 
globally and has made huge steps when it comes to involving civil society at the implementation stage, but 
important gaps remain as to accountability and meaningful participatory mechanisms. It shows that the 
proliferation of treaty bodies for the implementation of EU FTAs has not equated with an institutional 
architecture that can adequately safeguard fundamental rights. 
6. Conclusion  
Once a trade agreement is concluded, it is pivotal that the impact of its implementation on fundamental rights 
is monitored. It is also important that the institutional architecture creates an environment where its bodies are 
accountable and can deliberate and exchange views on fundamental rights in the context of trade. Starting from 
the question of the extent to which the institutional architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to protect fundamental 
rights, this paper has highlighted some of the main shortcomings of the institutional architecture of the new 
generation FTAs from a fundamental rights perspective. The results of the study lead to foresee little 
consideration of fundamental rights at the implementation stage. Historical institutionalism tells us that 
institutional design matters, for it affects the outcome. Rules for how institutions are to operate define the 
preferences of the members of the institutions and the interactions among them. Institutions will have 
distributional effects, which will be reflected in decisions-making processes. Historical institutionalism also 
tells us that it will be difficult for institutions to depart from certain practices once they are undertaken. The 
picture that emerges from the analysis of the institutional design of EU FTAs bodies at first sight suggests a 
departure from past practices where only Joint and Specialised Committees were created. In fact, when looking 
at what the new bodies are for and how they are to interact with the decision-making bodies, it may be said 
that the picture is one of two steps forward and three steps backwards. The institutional design falls short of 
creating an institutional architecture that can adequately protect fundamental rights or enable deliberation in 
their respect. 
The mandate of the DAGs and CSF is defined by the Parties to the agreement and can be said to reflect their 
preferences. There remain several gaps in what they can monitor and influence. Substantively, labour rights 
are the only set of rights to be the object of their monitoring. Procedurally, they have limited tools to monitor 
the work of the Joint and Specialised Committees. Deficiencies in decision-making processes and distributive 
effects are evident in the fact that the DAGs and the CSF remain consultative bodies; that they enjoy only 
discretional interaction with the Joint Committee; and that there are no follow-up mechanisms whereby they 
would know whether and how their views were taken into account. The layering and copy-pasting of treaty 
bodies across different FTAs shows that inefficient path-dependencies are already visible. As to the EP, the 
analysis has shown that it has no place in treaty bodies, nor has it a treaty body for itself. Its involvement could 
have accounted for political scrutiny, so that the implementation of FTAs is responsive to citizens’ preferences 
and safeguards their fundamental rights. The institutional architecture of EU FTAs could have institutionalised 
the involvement of the EP, alongside the creation of bodies for civil society, so as to reflect their demands to 
have a say and ensure that the efforts at democratising EU external trade do not stop at the negotiation stage.  
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